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1. Introduction 
 In a customs union, national governments are required to make collective decisions 
about the common trade policy. In contrast to national trade policy formation, in which voters 
within countries have rarely had the opportunity to vote directly on national trade, direct voting 
occurs when countries that are members of a customs union decide on the common external 
policy. In such instances, and contrary to the case of direct voting by citizens on national trade 
policy1 (but as in voting by elected national representatives), opportunities arise for logrolling.2 
This paper uses the case of the collective determination of the common European 
external tariff before the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) to study collective decision-making 
and the role of logrolling in a customs union. Light is also shed on the black box of European 
collective decision-making, since voting on the common external tariff took place behind closed 
doors (Schknecht, 1992) in the Council of Ministers3 (the main decision-making body of the 
European Community). Because voting in the Council has been hidden from public view an 
indirect method is required to infer how trade policy preferences (or indeed any policy 
preference) of national governments have been translated into an equilibrium collective decision. 
In order to indirectly examine the collective determination of the common external tariff, 
I use a unique dataset covering 81 manufacturing industries from 1969 until the adoption of the 
SEA in 1987 to derive national tariff preferences, which in turn are used to infer the collective 
decision making rule. The Treaty of Rome (1957) stipulated that decisions on the common 
                                                
1 See Mayer (1984). 
2 That is, vote trading can take place. Although trade in competitive markets results in efficient outcomes, logrolling 
does not necessarily result in Pareto efficiency. For an introduction to logrolling, see Hillman (2003b, chapter 3). 
3 The Council of Ministers is made up of ministers from each member state, with different ministers participating in 
the Council according to the subject under discussion—for instance, agricultural ministers discuss farm prices in the 
Agriculture Council, and economic and finance ministers discuss monetary affairs in the ECOFIN Council. 
Furthermore, each government acts as president of the Council for six months in rotation, thus allowing each 
country a turn in pursuing its own agenda (European Communities, 1999). And since the EC deals simultaneously in 
so many areas of policy, it is possible for negotiations to cover a wide variety of topics and thus be subject to 
logrolling. 
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external tariff were to be made via qualified-majority voting.4 However, until the adoption of the 
1987 SEA, under the Luxembourg Compromise (Hine, 1985), national governments had the 
power of veto against proposals deemed to be against their national interest.5 Along with 
exploring whether logrolling took place, then, I test whether unanimity was in effect (though 
unanimity, of course, could be the consequence of logrolling). Since the time period of the study 
covers three European Community (EC) enlargements,6 an opportunity is also provided to 
determine how equilibrium collective policy decisions changed when new countries joined the 
customs union. 
To model the decision-making processes in a political economy framework, a 
specification is required of the channels of influence over political decisions. In the EC, firms 
can either lobby their own national governments or the EC as a whole. Throughout the 1970s and 
80s, firms mostly lobbied via their national governments, and it was only when countries lost 
their veto power in the Council that firms began in earnest to set up offices in Brussels with the 
intent of lobbying other member countries as well (Mazey et al., 1993). Consequently, before the 
1987 SEA, the EC had a shallow integration, with little cross-country influence.7 These facts 
suggest a two-stage process for a model of collective decisions about tariff-determination. In the 
first stage, industry interest groups lobby national governments for protection. The national 
government in response selects a preferred tariff rate to maximize domestic political support 
based on the political cost of catering to interest group preferences (as in Hillman, 1982, and 
                                                
4 Qualified-majority requires about 71 percent of votes cast by all countries to pass a proposal. 
5 A country could vote against a proposal without it being a veto. The Single European Act did not abolish the 
power of veto, but rather suspended its use. 
6 In 1973, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark joined the founding members, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; in 1981, Greece became a member; and in 1986, Spain and Portugal were 
admitted. 
7 In the case of shallow integration, a customs union’s common external tariff reflects bargaining between member 
countries, and hence can be thought of as a Common Market, rather than a full economic union, as would be the 
case under deep integration (Cadot et al., 1999). 
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subsequent political economy specifications of decision-maker objectives). In the second stage, 
national governments vote in the Council to determine the equilibrium common external tariff, 
which is the duty preferred by the pivotal national government. 
The identity of the decisive national government depends on how decisions are made. 
One hypothesis is the unanimity that could have been achieved through logrolling. An alternative 
hypothesis is that some other voting rule was used. Since tariffs were declining over time during 
this period as a result of GATT8 trade rounds, proposals before the Council would have been to 
adopt a common external tariff that was lower than the status quo. With the unanimity rule of the 
Luxembourg Compromise, then, the decisive national government would have been that favoring 
the highest tariff, since that is the government that needed to be convinced to accept lower tariffs. 
For a qualified-majority rule, the pivotal national government would be the one whose 
preferences lied at the 71st percentile of the distribution of tariff preferences. With majority 
voting, the decisive national government would be the median voter. And for any voting rule, 
logrolling could have affected the collective decision. 
In considering logrolling, I take an intuitive approach that is novel to the literature. 
Logrolling allows national governments with a strong political interest in protecting politically 
important or sensitive domestic industries to accept a higher tariff on goods that are of less 
political importance, in order to obtain high tariffs for the politically important industries.9 In 
other words, if the decision rule required to pass a proposal is simple majority and proposals are 
to lower the tariff, for instance, the observed duty will actually be higher than if logrolling had 
not taken place. This is because the duty will reflect the preferences of a decisive country that 
                                                
8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has been superseded by the WTO (World Trade Organization). 
9 Previous empirical research on logrolling has focused on the U.S. Congress. See Stratmann (1997) for a survey of 
the literature. Previous studies on voting on trade policy have also concentrated on the U.S., where the actual vote is 
observed. See, for instance, Baldwin and Magee (2000). 
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favors a higher tariff than the one whose preferences lie at the median of the distribution. 
Similarly, if logrolling occurs on a proposal requiring qualified-majority to pass a decrease in the 
tariff, the decisive country’s preferred common external tariff (and hence the observed tariff) will 
lie at a percentile higher than the 71st percentile.  
As an identification mechanism for testing the unanimity rule against possible 
alternatives, I use the member enlargements that occurred since the adoption of the common 
external tariff. Because the composition of members changes over time as new countries join, 
there is potential for the political equilibrium to change, possibly in favor of a newer member,10 
thus providing for an additional source of variation in the data. To identify the pivotal country 
under each voting rule, and to determine whether logrolling took place, I derive each country’s 
preferred common external tariff level from each country’s pre-EC tariff rate. The decisive 
national government, then, is that whose preferred tariff rate lies at the appropriate percentile. 
The empirical results support the hypothesis of unanimity as the collective decision rule. 
The decisive national government is found to indeed be the one that prefers the highest tariff. 
This outcome is also consistent with logrolling. The results are robust to various sensitivity tests, 
including using alternative methods for identifying the pivotal member country. Furthermore, 
when examining how or if the political equilibrium changed over the years, the results suggest 
that the decisive country in some cases changed due to an enlargement, and that changes in the 
distribution of preferences do appear to have shifted the equilibrium. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the empirical strategy for determining 
which political-economy model best explains tariff rates. Section 3 describes the data, while 
                                                
10 A question that might be raised is whether the enlargements themselves are endogenous; in other words, whether 
countries join the EC because of trade considerations. Given, however, that the major impetus behind integration has 
been a desire to maintain stability in Europe, and that political, rather than trade issues have been the reason behind 
each accession, it is unlikely the enlargements are endogenous (European Commission, 2002). 
 6 
section 4 provides the empirical results and subjects them to a variety of sensitivity tests, while 
section 5 examines how the decisive country has changed over time. The final section 
summarizes the conclusions. 
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
2.1. Stage One: Interest Groups Lobby National Governments 
In stage one, standard political economy considerations establish the policy preferences 
of the national governments (Hillman, 1982; Hillman and Ursprung, 1988; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994).11 Since no assumptions are required about the means and type of lobbying that 
occurs in the EC, nor that groups that lobby are necessarily perfectly organized and seek to 
influence the entire structure of tariff rates, a general specification is used to motivate the 
empirical model. More specifically, I view tariff-setting governments in each country as 
choosing industry tariff rates that result in a politically-optimal industry deviation from efficient 
free trade that is in the public interest. With pit  the relative price of industry   i =1,…,n at time t; 
pit
!  the world price of that industry’s good (so that pit ! pit
"
= tit , the tariff rate on good i at time 
t), and !
it
"( )  indicating the profit function for the industry, a national government’s political 
support function is 
PSit = f ! pit( ) " ! pit
#( ), pit " pit
#( )        (1) 
where the first argument indicates the gain in industry profits or rents, and the second term 
represents the loss in consumer welfare from the tariff. The determination of the preferred 
common external tariff for an industry therefore involves the interests of the industry through 
profits or rents; of domestic consumers of the commodity who seek to maximize their utility; and 
                                                
11 See Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) for empirical applications of the 
Grossman-Helpman model. 
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of the national government, which trades off industry and consumer interests to maximize 
political support. 
Empirically, to identify where countries rank in their preferences, the political support 
function needs to be defined first. Because the focus of this paper is not on explaining the 
observed structure of protection across industries, but rather on shedding light on how collective 
decisions on the European common external tariff are made, the structure of the political support 
function comes not from a formal model, but rather from previous empirical studies (see Rodrik, 
1995, for instance). In particular, the literature predicts that protection is higher: 
• The larger the industry: the larger the industry seeking protection, measured as the share 
of employment in the industry, the greater is the incentive to be involved in the tariff-setting 
process. Furthermore, a large share of employment means the industry has more labor votes, 
which again increase protection. On the other hand, more employees makes it harder to organize 
as a result of the free rider problem, which in turn may decrease protection (Trefler, 1993). 
• The smaller the number of firms: a smaller number of firms alleviates the free rider 
problem in coordinating a lobby, thus increasing the level of protection. Many studies, however, 
find a positive, rather than a negative, effect. Hillman (1991) and Hillman et al. (2001), for 
instance, view lobbying as a case of private provision of a public good, since when successful, 
there is a public good-type benefit—increased protection—to all firms in the industry. A larger 
contribution by one firm does not necessarily decrease the contribution of other firms. As a 
result, increasing the number of firms in an industry can either increase or decrease the overall 
lobbying effort. 12 
                                                
12 Pecorino (1998) analyzes this issue in a repeated tariff lobbying game where cooperation may be maintained 
through the use of trigger strategies, so that the difficulty of maintaining cooperation is measured by the critical 
value of the discount parameter. He finds that the effect of an increase in the number of firms on the ability of 
maintaining cooperation is indeterminate. 
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• The lower the wage: disadvantaged industries often receive more protection. An 
industry is disadvantaged if it is a low-skill, and hence low-wage industry (see Trefler, 1993). 
• The higher its labor intensity: the more labor intensive an industry, the more labor votes 
it has. This is measured by the labor cost share in production. 
• The lower the level of intra-industry trade: industries seeking protection will find their 
task harder if they must counter not only consumer dissatisfaction, but also producers who 
purchase their goods as intermediates (see Marvel and Ray, 1987). 
• The higher the import penetration: the higher the import penetration, the more will the 
affected industry lobby for protection, so as to decrease competition and maintain its market share 
(Trefler 1993). The theoretical literature, however, predicts an ambiguous relationship. In 
particular, the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model predicts that if industries are perfectly 
organized, protection should be higher in industries with low import penetration, and if they are 
not organized, the relationship between protection and import penetration should be positive. 
Models predicting a negative relationship include Mayer (1984), Hillman (1982), and Findlay and 
Wellisz (1982). Another problem with this variable is its potential endogeneity, since a higher 
tariff can lower import penetration. This will be dealt with in section 5. 
• The greater the rise in import penetration: declining sectors (those with large increases 
in import penetration) tend to receive more protection so as to reduce adjustment costs 
(Olarreaga et al., 1999). 
• The smaller the share of exports in production: export-oriented industries do not require 
protection either because they face no import competition or because, with intra-industry trade, 
protection will provoke unwanted foreign retaliation (Trefler, 1993). 
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A dummy is also included to control for the Tokyo trade round, which occurred around 
the same time as the first enlargement.13 This is predicted to have a negative relationship with 
tariffs, since each GATT round resulted in multilateral tariff reductions. I use the trade round 
dummy rather than year fixed-effects because it generates a clear prediction.14 
To estimate each government’s preferred industry tariff rate, I use each country’s tariff 
rate from 1958, which is before a common tariff was established. This allows me to determine 
the relationship between each country’s tariff and the various components of its political support 
function. The equation estimated is: 
! 
t
ic
= "
1
+ "
2
C
ic
+ #
i
+ $
ic
        (2) 
where 
! 
t
ic
 is the 1958 tariff rate for industry i and country c; 
! 
C
ic
is the vector of characteristics for 
industry i and country c;15 !
i
 is an industry-specific fixed effect, which is included to account for 
any unobserved factors that are common to all countries but vary by industry; and 
! 
"
ic
 is the error 
term. Results are shown in Table 1. 
The coefficients from the estimation of equation (2) are then used to predict each 
country’s preferred tariff over time, based on industry data from 1969 to 1987. Here it is 
assumed that the function determining each member government’s preferred tariff does not 
change. It is possible, and highly likely, that this function may in fact change over time as new 
governments with different ideologies assume power in each country. Although it would be 
possible to control for whether a country’s right wing party or left wing party is in office, it is not 
clear that it would play a major role in the determination of preferred tariff rates. For instance, in 
                                                
13 The Tokyo Round began following the accession of the UK, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973, and concluded in 
1979. 
14 I also run the regressions with time fixed effects to see if that choice affected the results. 
15 Comparable industry data are not available for 1958. As a result, I used 1963 trade data together with 1963 
industry data for Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, and the Netherlands, and 1976 data for the UK and Ireland. 
Using solely the available 1963 data does not alter the conclusions. 
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the U.S., Republicans favored high tariffs until the Great Depression and opposed them 
subsequently; the converse holds for Democrats. But in any case, the predicted preferred tariff 
rates are only used to rank order the countries in preferred tariff rates, not for estimation 
purposes. To check for robustness of the results, however, other methods for determining the 
decisive country are used. More details are given in section 4. 
 
2.2. Stage Two: Voting in the Council of Ministers 
In the second stage, each minister of a member country arrives at the relevant Council 
meeting with his or her national government’s preferred tariff rate, as determined through 
expression (1) in the first stage. An industry in one country cannot at this point seek to influence 
a government in another country.16 That is, an industry in France can only affect France’s 
preferred tariff rate, not the preferred rate of Germany or Belgium. France’s representative may, 
however, exchange votes for a preferred trade policy with Germany or Belgium’s representative, 
so that voting may be affected by logrolling. Deliberations ensue and a vote is conducted to 
determine the common external tariff for the industry. The resulting tariff rate will be the duty 
preferred by the decisive national government.  
Which country is decisive in turn depends on how decisions are made. If the decision rule 
is unanimity, as the right of veto under the Luxembourg Compromise implies, the observed tariff 
rate will reflect the preference of the country with the most extreme preference. In other words, 
in the case of proposals to lower the tariff rate, the country favoring the highest tariff will be 
decisive, since this government needs to be convinced to lower the tariff.  
                                                
16 This assumption is consistent with the fact that firms during this period mostly lobbied their national governments 
(Mazey et al., 1993). 
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Under a qualified-majority rule, 5/7 of the votes in the Council are required to approve a 
proposal. This means that the decisive national government will be the one whose preferred tariff 
rate lies at the 71st percentile of the tariff distribution, assuming the proposal is to lower tariffs. 
This is because if there are 7 member states, for instance, the country that is most likely to object 
to a change in the tariff rate is the one with the most extreme position among the 5 that are 
needed to pass the proposal.  Finally, if decisions are made using simple majority, the observed 
tariff will reflect the preferences of the median country. 
However, given the opportunities that countries have at this stage to bargain and 
exchange votes for preferred tariff policies, tariff determination can also reflect logrolling. With 
decisions in the Council not directly observed, we need an indirect method to determine whether 
logrolling took place, and therefore whether intensity of preferences was taken into account in 
collective decision-making. 
A logrolling situation exists if two issues are adopted as a package even though they 
would not pass separately. This occurs when there is an unequal intensity of preferences. If one 
member state feels very strongly about protecting some key domestic industry but not about 
protecting the key domestic industry of another member state, the countries will have an 
incentive to trade votes with one another. For example, if Portugal has a strong preference for 
protecting its footwear industry, but is not concerned about the automobile industry, while 
Germany really wants to protect its automobile industry, but has no strong preference for the 
footwear industry, they have an incentive to trade votes. Portugal will agree to vote for the 
increased tariff in the sector Germany cares about, in exchange for Germany’s support in 
protecting the sector that Portugal cares about.17 The special interests in Germany are better off 
                                                
17 Note that given how decisions are made in the EC, France could also vote for a higher tariff in the sector Germany 
cares about in exchange for a vote for increased agricultural subsidies, for instance. 
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with the high tariffs on each sector than with low tariffs on both products. The special interests in 
the logrolling partner Portugal are similarly better off with the combined high tariffs.  
The outcome under logrolling, then, will be different than if logrolling had not taken 
place. More specifically, once the different intensities of preferences are taken into account, the 
observed common external tariff will be different, and thus reflect the preferences of a different 
pivotal government than if logrolling had not taken place. If the decision rule is simple 
majority,18 the outcome under logrolling will reflect the preferences of a more protectionist 
country than the median, such as the one at the 60th percentile of the distribution. This is because 
the observed tariff rate will be higher than if there were no vote trading, meaning either that a 
decrease in tariff was blocked or that the tariff decreased by less than it would have otherwise. 
The same is true under qualified majority. With logrolling, the decisive national government will 
now be the one whose tariff preferences lie at a higher percentile than the 71st, such as the 86th 
percentile.19  
The estimated equation, then, is given by 
! 
t
it
= "
1
+ "
2
C
it
d
+ "
3
T
t
+ #
i
+ $
it
      (3) 
where 
! 
t
it
 is the common external tariff for industry i at time t; C
it
d is the vector of the decisive 
country d’s characteristics for industry i and time t; 
! 
T
t
is a dummy indicating the conclusion of 
the Tokyo Round (equal to 1 starting in 1979); !
i
 is the industry-specific fixed effect, which is 
included to account for any time-invariant unobserved factors; and !
it
 is the error term. In other 
words, the observed common external tariff will reflect the political-economy characteristics of 
                                                
18 When voting for the common external tariff, simple majority is not allowed. It is included here, however, as a 
reference and as a check on the results. 
19 I use the 86th percentile because it lies between the 71st and the 100th percentile that is implied by unanimity. 
Given that the number of member states included in the analysis varies from 5 to 11, the choice of the 86th percentile 
also allows me to capture the national government whose preference lies between the 71st and the 100th percentiles 
(the same is true for the 60th percentile). 
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the decisive national government. One equation is estimated for each decision rule. As in Romer 
and Rosenthal (1982), the criterion for selecting which model best describes tariffs is the R-
squared. As alternatives to the decisive-country hypothesis, two additional specifications are 
included: one in which country’s industry characteristics are aggregated and another in which 
they are averaged. Furthermore, a specification where the decisive country is the one preferring 
the lowest tariff is also included to ensure the credibility of the results, as it would suggest that 
proposals were to increase the tariff, which is unlikely given GATT commitments.. Finally, two 
specifications of (3) are estimated to take into account the possibility that national government’s 
preferences may be weighted equally or differently according to the number of votes a country 
has in the Council (Table 2).20 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Tariffs 
Tariffs for 1958 were taken from Tariffs and Trade in Western Europe, and needed to be 
converted from the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) into the 3-digit industry classification 
(NACE). The sample includes data for 81 industries and seven member countries.21  
Tariff rates for the EC were obtained from various issues of the Official Journal of the 
European Communities (which publishes the common tariff schedule annually). Import duties 
are expressed in three ways: as ad valorem tariffs equal to a percentage of the product’s value; as 
specific tariffs per unit weight, volume, or number of pieces; or as a combination of the two. In 
all cases, tariffs are based on the CIF value (cost, insurance, freight). Duties are expressed as 
                                                
20 Votes in the Council are weighted. The unweighted alternative is included, however, to account for the fact that it 
is the European Commission that drafts proposals and negotiates treaties. It also serves as a check to see whether 
decisions are made at the Council or at the Commission-level. 
21 The countries are Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the UK. 
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conventional duties,22 and only the ad valorem duties are used. In some instances, the duties 
were expressed as a combination of ad valorem and specific tariffs. As a result, the 16 affected 
industries were dropped from the sample.23 Data were collected for every other year, beginning 
with 1969.24 Details on assembly are provided in the Appendix. 
 
3.2. Industry and Trade 
Industry data for 1976-87 come from Eurostat’s Structure and Activity of Industry: 
Annual Inquiry, Main Results. This publication covers all enterprises in industries employing 20 
or more persons (with the exception of Spain and Portugal, which contain data for all 
enterprises). The data were collected for the publication year, rather than the year tariffs entered 
into force; this was done because the publication year more closely reflected the time when the 
decision was made. Industry data for 1963 were obtained from Eurostat’s Études et enquêtes 
statistiques, from 1969. Data on exports and imports for the 1976-87 period come from 
Eurostat’s EEC External Trade (Nimexe) 1976-87, Supplement 2. Data for 1963 and 1969-75 
were obtained from Feenstra et al. (2005). 
 
4. Results 
Results are shown in Table 3 for the unweighted specification, and Table 4 for the 
weighted specification. All regressions include a full set of industry-specific fixed effects.  
Standard errors are both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent. The results indicate 
                                                
22 Conventional duties are duties that are applicable to imported goods originating in countries which are contracting 
parties to the GATT, or with which the EC has concluded agreements containing the most-favored nation tariff. 
23 I experimented with including those industries by using only the ad valorem part of the tariff rate and obtained the 
same results. 
24 It was decided to start with the 1969 issue, rather than the 1968 (which marked the beginning of the Common 
Customs Tariff) because there was no tariff schedule published in 1970. 
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that the second unanimity model (in which the decisive country is the one preferring the highest 
tariff) performs best, as it has the highest R-squared. The results also suggest that the share of 
employment, the number of firms, the change in import penetration, and the Tokyo Round 
dummy are significant in explaining tariff rates and had the expected signs, providing further 
support to this model. The wage was also significant, but had a positive, rather than the expected 
negative effect on the tariff. These results then provide strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis 
that before the 1987 Single European Act, the decisive national government was the one favoring 
the highest tariff. 
 
4.1. Sensitivity Analysis 
Comparing models on the basis of their R-squared is not the only way of deciding which 
one best explains the variable of interest. Because the estimated equations are OLS regressions, 
and each estimated equation contains the same number of regressors and the dependent variable 
is the same, the R-squared is an appropriate measure for comparing the different models.25 To 
further test the robustness of the results, though, I perform J-tests of the second unanimity 
specification against all the other possible decision rules. The J-test, as proposed by Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1981), is a procedure for choosing between non-nested models. The J-test, 
then, can be used to see if the model that had the highest R-squared does in fact have a greater 
explanatory power than the alternatives, but it has the disadvantage that oftentimes it is 
impossible to make a selection between models. In particular, in a finite sample, the test of the 
H0 versus H1 can lead to four possibilities: reject both, neither, or either one of the two 
hypotheses (Greene 1997). Another disadvantage is that it is a weak test, and hence one cannot 
obtain a ranking of models, as one does with the R-squared.  
                                                
25 Using the Akaike Information Criterion, or the Schwarz Criterion will lead to the same conclusion in this case. 
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The results, shown in Table 5, indicate that this is indeed the case. The second unanimity 
rule (highest preferred tariff) rejects all specifications, but it is also rejected by the other models. 
The t-statistic when it is the alternative hypothesis is always higher than when it is the null, 
which gives some support to the finding that the second unanimity model performs better in 
explaining tariff rates. 
Another potential source of concern is the fact that some of the variables used as 
indicators of political influence present a potential endogeneity problem. For instance, the higher 
the tariff, the less will domestic consumers buy of imported goods, resulting in a decrease in 
imports altogether. It would be desirable to consider the joint determination of import penetration 
levels with tariff protection and perform a simultaneous estimation of the two equations, as in 
Trefler (1993). Due to data restrictions, however, such an approach is not possible.26 The first 
column in Tables 6 and 7, though, present the R-squareds from running the same regressions as 
before, only this time without the import penetration variables. What is found is that the results 
do not change in either specification. 
Now, one problem that has been pointed out repeatedly in the literature concerns the use 
of import shares as weights when aggregating tariffs to the industry level. As a result, this paper 
uses a simple rather than a weighted average, but to ensure that this choice did not affect the 
results, I experimented with using the import shares as weights and re-ran the regressions to 
determine whether the choice of weights had any impact on the results. As indicated in the 
second column of Tables 6 and 7, the second unanimity model still fits best in both 
specifications. This suggests that the results are robust to the choice of a weighting scheme. 
                                                
26 Trefler estimates a simultaneous equation Tobit model, with one equation with non-tariff barriers and another with 
import penetration as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables used in the import penetration equation are 
measures of factor endowments, which are not available for the EC at a detailed enough level and for the period in 
question. 
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Furthermore, since the industry and trade data for 1976 were used to represent the 
characteristics for the 1969-75 period, it is possible that these results might be subject to 
measurement error. To investigate this, the same regressions were run, only now restricting the 
sample to 1977-87. The results are shown in the third column of Tables 6 and 7. Again, the 
model in which the pivotal country is the one favoring the highest tariff performs best. 
Another possible concern that might arise regards the use of a Tokyo Round dummy 
instead of time fixed-effects. To investigate whether this choice affected the results obtained, I 
re-ran all regressions, only this time including time dummies in place of the Tokyo Round 
dummy. As shown in column 4 of Tables 6 and 7, the second unanimity specification did still 
perform better than all the other specifications. 
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Tables 6 and 7 present the results of regressions using 
different functional forms. In column 6, none of the variables are in logs; whereas in column 7, 
only the dependent variable is not in logs. The conclusions drawn are insensitive to this change 
in functional form. 
 
4.2. Revisiting the Decisive Country 
A final possible concern that might be raised consists of how the decisive country is 
determined in the first place. In particular, an assumption was made that the function that 
determines tariff rates in 1958 is unchanged over time. To ensure that the results are not affected 
by this assumption, two additional methods are used to identify the decisive country. 
In the first case, the industry characteristics included are those lying at the relevant 
percentile. For example, if the voting rule is qualified-majority, the decisive country is the one 
whose industry characteristics lie at the 71st percentile. The percentile used can be ascending or 
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descending, depending on the sign prediction. From section 2, it was predicted that the share of 
employment in the country, the labor intensity, the import penetration and the change in import 
penetration were all positively related to the tariff rates, whereas the number of firms and the 
export intensity were anticipated to exhibit a negative relationship. For those with the positive 
relation, the percentile is, for example, the 60th; but for those showing a negative relationship, the 
appropriate percentile is the 40th rather than the 60th. Results are shown in Tables 8 and 9 for the 
unweighted and weighted specification, respectively. They indicate that the unanimity model in 
which the country favoring the highest tariff is pivotal still has the best fit. It is also seen that the 
share of employment, the number of firms, the change in import penetration, and the Tokyo 
Round dummy are all significant and of the same sign as when the decisive country was derived 
from predicting preferred tariffs. The wage rate, however, is again found to have a positive rather 
than the predicted negative relationship to the tariff rate. A further result is that the labor cost 
share is now significant and of the expected sign.  
This methodology, however, has a drawback. If one were to count the number of times 
that a country’s industry characteristics matched the appropriate percentile in the distribution, 
and do it for every industry characteristic, one will most likely find an inconsistent decisive 
country. For example, it is possible that according to this methodology, the decisive country 
according to the share of employment is Italy, while France was the decisive country in the 
number of firms and wage rate, Germany in labor intensity and import penetration, and Belgium 
in the change in import penetration and export intensity. This, then, results in an inconsistent 
result, in that there are four potential decisive countries. To circumvent this problem, simple 
bivariate OLS regressions are run to determine which of the industry characteristics were the 
most influential in affecting tariffs. The decisive country is then the one whose most influential 
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characteristic lies at the relevant percentile. The results for both the unweighted and the vote-
weighted cases are shown in Tables 10 and 11. Again, the model where the decisive country is 
the one favoring the highest tariff is preferred, with the number of firms, and the Tokyo Round 
dummy being significant and of the expected sign as before. Once more, however, the wage rate 
has the opposite relationship than what was predicted. Furthermore, the intra-industry index and 
the export share are now also significant and of the expected sign. These results then provide 
further support for the finding that from 1969 to 1987, decisions regarding the common external 
tariff were made unanimously, with possible logrolling involved. 
 
5. Examining Changes in the Decisive National Government 
The final objective consists of exploring how the distribution of countries has shifted 
over time for the original set of member countries, and where the new member countries came 
into the distribution, so as to determine whether changes in the decisive national government 
were due to shifts in the distribution or to the enlargements. The results presented in Table 10 
rank countries on the basis of their preferred tariff rates in the textile industry. 27 The focus is on 
the years before and after each enlargement, so as to illustrate its impact on the decisive country. 
According to the results, the first enlargement in 1973 did not cause a change in the 
decisive country, but both in 1981 and 1987, a new member became pivotal, with Greece in 1981 
and Portugal in 1987. There is also an instance where the position of governments in the 
                                                
27 This industry was selected because it is one of the sectors where protection plays a large role in the industry’s 
strategy, so much so that it has become a very powerful lobby, seeking to curb competition from low wage 
countries, which it feels can destroy the industry in the EC. Indeed, lobbying was decisive in the renewal of the 
Multi-Fiber Agreement in 1977, where, due to France’s introduction of quotas on textiles and clothing in violation 
of the Community’s rules, as well as indications that other members might follow suit, the EC increased barriers to 
imports (Hine 1985). The industry represents about 10 percent of companies in the EC, and employs over 2.3 
million people. The EC is the world’s second largest exporter of textiles and clothing products, and the largest 
exporter of textiles (DG Trade 2001). This sector has the heaviest concentration of employment in Lombardy (Italy), 
Catalunya (Spain), Bavaria and Nordrhein-Westfalen (Germany), Norte (Portugal), Wallonie (Belgium), and Région 
du Nord (France) (WTO 1998). 
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distribution shifted, with the shifts causing a change in the equilibrium. In particular, in 1979, 
France favored the highest tariff, thus replacing Italy as the pivotal country. These results 
provide evidence that shifts in the pivotal country may have occurred due to the entry of new 
countries at the top of the distribution, as well as to movements along the distribution. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Missing from the study of customs unions has been the determination by national 
governments of the common external trade policy. The most prominent and successful customs 
union has been that of Europe. I have used a unique dataset to derive politically motivated 
national tariff preferences in the EC, which have been applied to investigating collective 
decisions about the common external tariff before the Single European Act. How each 
government votes in the Council has not been public information and so has not been observable. 
I therefore sought to infer the decision rule that translates national governments’ preferences 
influenced by special interests into an equilibrium common external tariff. A novel approach has 
been to regard logrolling as another decision rule that allows intensity of preferences to be taken 
into account in decision-making. The variation resulting from countries joining the EC has been 
used to identify the collective decision rule and determine whether logrolling took place. 
The empirical test consisted of regressing the preference-determining characteristics of 
the decisive national government (for each decision rule) against the common external tariff 
level for 81 manufacturing industries over the 1969-87 period. As expected, the rule that best 
explained tariffs was found to be unanimity, with the pivotal country being the one favoring the 
highest tariff. Again, because logrolling allows for countries to misrepresent their tariff 
preferences, unanimity also implies logrolling. If countries were voting according to the qualified 
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majority rule, and proposals are to increase the tariff, the decisive national government would be 
the one whose preferred tariff lies at the 71st percentile of the distribution. With logrolling, 
however, the decisive national government’s preference lies at a lower percentile, since one 
national government is voting against a tariff decrease (or in favor of a tariff increase) for one 
industry in exchange for a similar vote for another industry of greater political importance. These 
results were robust to a variety of sensitivity tests. 
The countries’ derived common external tariff preferences allowed for conclusions to be 
made about how the decisive country changed over time, and whether the changes were due to 
shifts in the distribution of national government’s preferences, or to the enlargements. The 
results for the politically sensitive or influential textile industry provide evidence of shifts in the 
political equilibrium due to the entry of new countries at the top of the distribution, as well as to 
movements along the distribution. 
Now, because countries had veto power and the common external tariff, though trending 
downwards as a result of GATT trade rounds, did not change much throughout the period, it 
would seem reasonable that decisions were made unanimously, with the pivotal country being 
the one favoring the highest tariff. Furthermore, throughout the analysis, specifications using the 
sum and the mean of countries’ characteristics were also estimated as a test of this decisive-
country model, along with one where the pivotal country was the one preferring the lowest tariff, 
but none of them had a better explanatory power. These findings then provide strong support for 
the decisive country framework used to describe how decisions were made in the EC before the 
ability to veto was suspended. 
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8. Appendix—Dataset Construction 
8.1. Tariffs 
Tariff rates before 1987 are classified in the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN), which 
needed to be converted to the 3-digit level of the EC’s Industrial Classification, named NACE,28 
in order to match the industry data. A concordance table between the 6-digit Nimexe29 and the 3-
digit NACE, from Jon Haveman’s Industry Concordances web site,30 was used. Nimexe is 
closely related to the BTN, in that it corresponds exactly at the 4-digit level. In order to 
determine the 6-digit equivalent, the description of the Nimexe category was compared to the 
description of the BTN subdivisions until a match was made. 
Some of the NACE categories corresponded to only one Nimexe, but in most cases, there 
were several Nimexe that made up one NACE industry. Rather than averaging all the 
corresponding tariff rates, which would have made it difficult to accurately reflect the size of 
changes in the level of protection, it was decided to use only the products that accounted for at 
least 10 percent of the trade in an industry. For the industries where no product met that 
threshold, or for those where all the products meeting that threshold, taken together, did not 
account for at least 50 percent of the trade, I included all the products with the highest trade 
share which, when taken together, met the 50 percent threshold. For many NACE industries, 
however, more than one product was used to represent the industry. In this case, the tariff rates 
were aggregated using a simple average.31 
                                                
28 General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities within the European Comminutes. 
29 Nomenclature of Goods for the External Trade of the Community and Statistics of Trade between Member States. 
30 http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/TradeConcordances.html 
31 To check for the robustness of the results, I also ran regressions using the import-weighted tariff. The simple 
average was used because using import shares as weights when aggregating tariffs to the industry level can 
potentially cause a low weight to be attached to products that face high tariffs, since those goods are likely to have 
low imports for reasons stated above. Lee and Swagel (1995) construct average tariffs using import and production 
shares as weights. Production shares, however, tend to overstate protection, much in the same way that import shares 
understate them. 
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Tariff data for 1987 were in the Combined Nomenclature (CN), which, again, needed to 
be converted to the 3-digit level of NACE. The correspondence table between the two 
classifications was taken from Eurostat’s Intra- and Extra-EU Trade (Combined Nomenclature), 
Supplement 2. As before, some of the NACE classes corresponded to only one CN category, but 
in most cases, there were several CN categories that made up one NACE industry. As a result, 
the same procedure outlined above was used. 
 
8.2. Industry and Trade 
Because the industry data contained missing observations, it was necessary to linearly 
interpolate the missing values using the previous and next year’s data. This was not always 
possible, since there were instances where only the previous or the following year’s was 
available (but not both). In those cases, the data from the closest year were used to fill in what 
was missing. A criterion was also established to determine whether an industry should be kept or 
dropped for lack of data. As long as there were at least five out of the total possible 11 countries 
available,32 and sufficient years for interpolation to be used; and as long as data on all variables 
were available, the industry was kept. Observations were also dropped whenever the reported 
values were combined with that of another industry for reasons of confidentiality. In the end, out 
of 124 3-digit NACE industries, 80 were included. The 3-digit level was selected because that 
was the most detailed available. Data from 1963 were in the previous industry classification, 
named NICE. These were converted in NACE categories using the concordance from the 
Université Catholique de Louvain’s Département des sciences économiques website.33 Since no 
                                                
32 I omit Luxembourg because its industry data is sparse, the trade values are not provided for Belgium and 
Luxembourg separately, and because the two countries were already a customs union before they joined the EC. 
33http://www.econ.ucl.ac.be/ECON/FR/SERVICES/LOGISTIQUE/NOMENCLATURES/CONCORDANCES/nace
ctci.html. 
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industry data were available from 1969 to 1975, the values were linearly interpolated from 1963 
to 1976, when both years were available. In cases where there were no 1963 observations, the 
1976 data was also used for the 1969-75 period, under the assumption that these characteristics 
had not changed much over that period.34 
Data on firms employing less than 20 persons are available in 5-year intervals, though not 
for all country-industry pairs. Only in 1983 do the data refer to firms employing 1 to 19 persons 
(in 1978 and 1989, the data are only for firms employing 10 to 19 persons).35 A correction was 
then performed using this data. 
Trade data from 1976-87 were aggregated from the 6-digit Nimexe into the 3-digit 
NACE.36 Data for the earlier period were converted from SITC revision 2 to NACE. 
                                                
34 Magee and Lee (2001) refer to a 10-year period for industry adjustment. 
35 Not performing the correction does not alter the conclusions drawn. To further check for robustness, I also run 
regressions omitting all trade-related explanatory variables. See Section 4 for details. 
36 Another issue was that trade data for Belgium referred to both Belgium and Luxembourg. To separate Belgium’s 
share, I used the share of population in Belgium to adjust the data. 
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Table 1. Determining Preferred Tariff Rates 
Dependent variable: ln(1+ common external 
tariff) (simple average) 
Employment Share -0.210*** 
 
 
(0.062) 
# Firms -0.016 
 
 
(0.027) 
Wage -0.562*** 
 
 
(0.101) 
Labor Cost Share -0.094 
 
 
(0.231) 
Intra-industry Ratio 0.134** 
 
 
(0.064) 
Import Penetration -0.124 
 
 
(0.080) 
Export Share -0.152** 
 
 
(0.075) 
Obs 449 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6092 
F-statistic 15.19 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 7 countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and the 
UK) and 81 industries. Industry and trade data are from 1963 and 1976, while the tariff is from 1958. 
Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are significant at the 1-
percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are significant at the 10-
percent level. All variables are in logs. The estimated equations also include a full set of industry dummies, as well 
as a constant. The relationship between the 1958 country-specific tariffs and the industry characteristics were used to 
forecast each national government’s preferred tariff rates over the 1969-1987. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Votes in Council of Ministers 
 
Country 
Number of Votes 
(EC-6) 
Number of Votes 
(EC-9, EC-10, EC-12) 
Belgium, Netherlands 
 
2 5 
Denmark, Ireland 
 
 3 
France, Germany, Italy 
 
4 10 
Greece, Portugal 
 
 5 
Luxembourg 
 
1 2 
Spain 
 
 8 
UK 
 
 10 
Source: European Communities (1999). 
Note: EC-6 refers to the EC before the first enlargement in 1973. EC-9 refers to the EC following the first 
enlargement, EC-10 denotes the EC after the second enlargement in 1981, and EC-12 indicates the EC following the 
third enlargement in 1986.  
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Table 3. Unweighted Regressions Explaining Common External Tariff 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity 
2 
Sum Mean 
Employment  -0.009 0.004 -0.010 -0.027* -0.009 -0.025** -0.036 -0.033 
Share 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.040) (0.035) 
# Firms 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.049*** 0.009 0.076*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013) 
Wage -0.027 -0.009 0.008 0.047 0.029* 0.070*** -0.029 0.061** 
 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.016) (0.021) (0.036) (0.029) 
Labor Cost  0.107*** 0.001 0.032 0.025 -0.008 -0.033 0.077 0.161*** 
Share 
 
(0.028) (0.027) (0.036) (0.050) (0.025) (0.029) (0.076) (0.062) 
Intra-industry -0.038*** -0.013 0.001 -0.007 0.007 -0.017 -0.042** -0.057* 
Ratio 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.020) (0.031) 
Import  0.008 -0.003 -0.010 -0.029** -0.035*** -0.008 -0.015 -0.012 
Penetration 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) (0.018) 
∆ Import  0.0002 0.001** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002** 0.001*** 0.002** 
Penetration 
 
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Export Share -0.049*** -0.025*** -0.022** 0.001 0.010 -0.0001 -0.060*** -0.025 
 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.008) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) 
Tokyo  -0.180*** -0.196*** -0.190*** -0.194*** -0.178*** -0.153*** -0.175*** -0.147*** 
Round 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
R-squared (within) 0.4268 0.3937 0.3995 0.4036 0.4273 0.4620 0.4072 0.4272 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3552 0.3180 0.3245 0.3290 0.3557 0.3947 0.3331 0.3556 
F-statistic 68.5057 60.8780 61.3948 60.9592 62.3253 71.3048 64.8373 74.6318 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Tokyo Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1979). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across 
countries, and the sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Preferred tariff rates for each national government were 
forecasted over the 1969-1987 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against 
industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). 
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Table 4. Weighted Regressions Explaining Common External Tariff 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity 
2 
Sum Mean 
Employment  -0.009 -0.020 -0.020 -0.029* -0.028 -0.025** 0.061 -0.061 
Share 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.011) (0.040) (0.043) 
# Firms 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.037*** 0.049*** -0.054*** 0.081*** 
 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.016) 
Wage -0.027 -0.042 -0.032 -0.021 0.034 0.070*** -0.051 0.040 
 
 
(0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.031) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.033) 
Labor Cost  0.107*** 0.028 0.102** 0.108** 0.026 -0.033 0.029 0.201*** 
Share 
 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041) (0.029) (0.073) (0.068) 
Intra-industry -0.038*** -0.018* -0.009 -0.002 0.001 -0.017 -0.026 -0.053* 
Ratio 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.029) 
Import  0.008 -0.015 -0.005 -0.038** -0.035** -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 
Penetration 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) 
∆ Import  0.0002 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.0002** 0.002*** 
Penetration 
 
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) 
Export Share -0.049*** -0.029*** -0.035** 0.008 0.011 -0.0001 -0.054*** -0.026 
 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) 
Tokyo  -0.180*** -0.182*** -0.177*** -0.181*** -0.187*** -0.153*** -0.174*** -0.147*** 
Round 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) 
Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
R-squared (within) 0.4268 0.4057 0.4140 0.4095 0.4134 0.4620 0.4160 0.4258 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3552 0.3314 0.3408 0.3356 0.3401 0.3947 0.3430 0.3540 
F-statistic 68.5057 60.5277 60.7639 60.5109 61.5083 71.3048 66.8389 73.7175 
 Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Tokyo Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1979). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across 
countries, and the sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Preferred tariff rates for each national government were 
forecasted over the 1969-1987 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against 
industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). All regressions are weighted by the number of votes each country 
has in the Council of Ministers. 
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Table 5. J-Tests 
  Unweighted Weighted 
Null Alternative t-stat Conclusion t-stat Conclusion 
Unanimity 1 Unanimity 2 8.94*** Reject 8.94*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 Unanimity 1 
 
6.33*** Reject 6.33*** Reject 
Median Unanimity 2 7.22*** Reject 6.07*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 
 
Median 2.36** Reject 2.75*** Reject 
Logrolling 1 Unanimity 2 9.50*** Reject 9.21*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 Logrolling 1 
 
3.83*** Reject 5.00*** Reject 
QMV Unanimity 2 9.50*** Reject 9.21*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 
 
QMV 3.79*** Reject 3.85*** Reject 
Logrolling 2 Unanimity 2 9.50*** Reject 9.21*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 
 
Logrolling 2 
 
2.40** Reject 2.12** Reject 
Sum Unanimity 2 8.70*** Reject 8.95*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 
 
Sum 4.12*** Reject 6.76*** Reject 
Mean Unanimity 2 7.99*** Reject 8.31*** Reject 
Unanimity 2 Mean 4.62*** Reject 4.95*** Reject 
Note: * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and *** at the 1 percent level. 
Estimates marked *** are significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; 
and those marked * are significant at the 10-percent level. Unanimity 1 refers to the model testing unanimity (in 
which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the assumption that the status 
quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the qualified-majority voting 
requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test possible logrolling outcomes 
(60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is the one preferring the 
highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across countries, and the sum 
regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as alternatives to the decisive 
national government framework. Preferred tariff rates for each national government were forecasted over the 1987-
2005 period using the results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against industry and trade 
characteristics (see Table 1). All regressions are weighted by the number of votes each country has in the Council of 
Ministers. 
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Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis—Unweighted Specification 
 
Hypothesis Decision Rule 
Import 
Pen 
Tariff 
weight 
77-87 Time 
FE's 
Linear Lin Log 
Shallow 
Integration 
Unanimity 1 
 
0.4255 0.3856 0.2151 0.6099 0.3102 0.3373 
 Median 
 
0.3914 0.3750 0.2204 0.6043 0.3076 0.3215 
 Logrolling 1 
 
0.3933 0.3743 0.2373 0.6040 0.3104 0.3140 
 QMV 
 
0.3954 0.3679 0.3191 0.6038 0.3102 0.3060 
 Logrolling 2 
 
0.4198 0.3866 0.2993 0.6159 0.3234 0.3312 
 Unanimity 2 
 
0.4566 0.4260 0.3465 0.6214 0.3355 0.3613 
Deep 
Integration 
EU-Wide 
 
0.4016 0.3858 0.3077 0.6104 0.3207 0.3364 
 Mean 
 
0.4240 0.3974 0.2956 0.6055 0.3167 0.3448 
 Obs. 810 810 486 810 810 810 
 Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). Columns refer 
to different sensitivity tests, while each row corresponds to a voting model. Each cell refers to the within R-squared 
for a particular model and specification. Unanimity 1 refers to the model testing unanimity (in which the decisive 
national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the assumption that the status quo is lower than 
proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to 
the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, 
respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean 
regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across countries, and the sum regression, in which industry 
characteristics are summed across country, are included as alternatives to the decisive national government 
framework. Preferred tariff rates for each national government were forecasted over the 1969-1987 period using the 
results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). 
 The sensitivity tests are as follows: import pen. refers to a specification without the import penetration and the 
change in import penetration, which are potentially endogenous; tariff weight refers to having the import-weighted 
common tariff, rather than the simple average, as the dependent variable; 77-87 indicates that the sample was 
constrained to the 1977-87 period; time FE’s indicates that time fixed-effects were included instead of a Tokyo 
Round dummy; linear refers to a specification in which neither dependent nor independent variables are in logs, 
while lin-log is a specification where only the independent variables are in logs.  
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Table 7. Sensitivity Analysis—Weighted Specification 
 
Hypothesis Decision Rule 
Import 
Pen 
Tariff 
weight 
77-87 Time 
FE's 
Linear Lin Log 
Shallow 
Integration 
Unanimity 1 
 
0.4255 0.3856 0.2151 0.6099 0.3102 0.3373 
 Median 
 
0.3958 0.3810 0.2207 0.6095 0.3143 0.3272 
 Logrolling 1 
 
0.4082 0.3924 0.2430 0.6070 0.3125 0.3285 
 QMV 
 
0.4019 0.3776 0.2965 0.6022 0.3157 0.3037 
 Logrolling 2 
 
0.4073 0.3683 0.3010 0.6131 0.3155 0.3184 
 Unanimity 2 
 
0.4566 0.4260 0.3465 0.6214 0.3355 0.3613 
Deep 
Integration 
EU-Wide 
 
0.4146 0.3900 0.2946 0.6098 0.3109 0.3498 
 Mean 
 
0.4222 0.3974 0.2905 0.6060 0.3196 0.3435 
 Obs. 810 810 486 810 810 810 
 Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). Columns refer 
to different sensitivity tests, while each row corresponds to a voting model. Each cell refers to the within R-squared 
for a particular model and specification. Unanimity 1 refers to the model testing unanimity (in which the decisive 
national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the assumption that the status quo is lower than 
proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to 
the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, 
respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean 
regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across countries, and the sum regression, in which industry 
characteristics are summed across country, are included as alternatives to the decisive national government 
framework. Preferred tariff rates for each national government were forecasted over the 1969-1987 period using the 
results from a regression of 1958 country-specific tariffs against industry and trade characteristics (see Table 1). 
 The sensitivity tests are as follows: import pen. refers to a specification without the import penetration and the 
change in import penetration, which are potentially endogenous; tariff weight refers to having the import-weighted 
common tariff, rather than the simple average, as the dependent variable; 77-87 indicates that the sample was 
constrained to the 1977-87 period; time FE’s indicates that time fixed-effects were included instead of a Tokyo 
Round dummy; linear refers to a specification in which neither dependent nor independent variables are in logs, 
while lin-log is a specification where only the independent variables are in logs. All regressions are weighted by the 
number of votes each country has in the Council of Ministers. 
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Table 8: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Industry Characteristics 
 Unanimity 1 Median Logrolling 1 QMV Logrolling 2 Unanimity 2 Sum Mean 
Employment  0.053*** 0.027 0.001 0.067** 0.011 -0.050* -0.036 -0.033 
Share 
 
(0.015) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.022) (0.027) (0.040) (0.035) 
# Firms 0.007 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.009 0.076*** 
 
 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.013) 
Wage -0.035 0.026 0.049* 0.109*** 0.068*** 0.101*** -0.029 0.061** 
 
 
(0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.016) (0.018) (0.036) (0.029) 
Labor Cost  0.058* 0.217*** 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.106*** 0.054* 0.077 0.161*** 
Share 
 
(0.030) (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.035) (0.032) (0.076) (0.062) 
Intra-industry -0.058 -0.030 -0.028* -0.046*** -0.022** -0.012 -0.042** -0.057* 
Ratio 
 
(0.044) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.031) 
Import  0.030* -0.010 0.006 0.014 0.011 -0.009 -0.015 -0.012 
Penetration 
 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018) 
∆ Import  0.0004** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.0002 0.0004* 0.001*** 0.002** 
Penetration 
 
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Export Share -0.051*** -0.023 -0.028* -0.036** -0.016 0.001 -0.060*** -0.025 
 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) 
Tokyo  -0.149*** -0.144*** -0.159*** -0.166*** -0.174*** -0.139*** -0.175*** -0.147*** 
Round 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
R-squared (within) 0.4376 0.4331 0.4280 0.4533 0.4444 0.4818 0.4072 0.4272 
Adj R-squared 0.3673 0.3623 0.3565 0.3849 0.3750 0.4170 0.3331 0.3556 
F-statistic 69.8318 75.5643 70.9834 66.8558 72.4385 71.2162 64.8373 74.6318 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Tokyo Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1979). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across 
countries, and the sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Regressions are based on data for the country or 
countries whose industry characteristics lie at the relevant percentile. 
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Table 9: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Industry Characteristics, Weighted 
Specification 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity 
2 
Sum Mean 
Employment  0.053*** -0.007 -0.009 0.012 -0.015 -0.050* 0.061 -0.061 
Share 
 
(0.015) (0.033) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.040) (0.043) 
# Firms 0.007 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.066*** 0.079*** 0.064*** -0.054*** 0.081*** 
 
 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.016) 
Wage -0.035 0.014 0.057* 0.022 0.061** 0.101*** -0.051 0.040 
 
 
(0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.024) (0.018) (0.035) (0.033) 
Labor Cost  0.058* 0.279*** 0.144** 0.190*** 0.084* 0.054* 0.029 0.201*** 
Share 
 
(0.030) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058) (0.048) (0.032) (0.073) (0.068) 
Intra-industry -0.058 -0.050** -0.016 -0.032** -0.019 -0.012 -0.026 -0.053* 
Ratio 
 
(0.044) (0.022) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019) (0.029) 
Import  0.030* -0.017 -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015 
Penetration 
 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.018) 
∆ Import  0.0004** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.0001 0.0004* 0.0002** 0.002*** 
Penetration 
 
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.001) 
Export Share -0.051*** -0.035** -0.021 -0.032** -0.004 0.001 -0.054*** -0.026 
 
 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) 
Tokyo  -0.149*** -0.145*** -0.160*** -0.157*** -0.168*** -0.139*** -0.174*** -0.147*** 
Round 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
R-squared (within) 0.4376 0.4391 0.4230 0.4267 0.4378 0.4818 0.4160 0.4258 
Adj R-squared 0.3673 0.3690 0.3509 0.3550 0.3675 0.4170 0.3430 0.3540 
F-statistic 69.8318 67.7503 68.1814 60.4478 71.1737 71.2162 66.8389 73.7175 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Tokyo Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1979). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across 
countries, and the sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Regressions are based on data for the country or 
countries whose industry characteristics lie at the relevant percentile. All regressions are weighted by the number of 
votes each country has in the Council of Ministers. 
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Table 10: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Most Influential Characteristic 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity 
2 
Sum Mean 
Employment  -0.0002 0.008 0.027** -0.010 -0.009 0.011 -0.036 -0.033 
Share 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.040) (0.035) 
# Firms 0.024*** 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.009 0.076*** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.013) 
Wage 0.018 0.058** 0.025 0.025 0.092*** 0.064*** -0.029 0.061** 
 
 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.036) (0.029) 
Labor Cost  0.033 -0.009 0.111*** 0.088*** -0.043* -0.021 0.077 0.161*** 
Share 
 
(0.027) (0.035) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.076) (0.062) 
Intra-industry 0.003 -0.024** -0.008 -0.027*** -0.014 -0.017* -0.042** -0.057* 
Ratio 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.020) (0.031) 
Import  0.004 0.011 0.007 0.016 0.014 0.014 -0.015 -0.012 
Penetration 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.018) 
∆ Import  0.0004** 0.001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.001*** 0.002** 
Penetration 
 
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) 
Export Share -0.047*** -0.011 -0.008 -0.027*** -0.012 -0.017* -0.060*** -0.025 
 
 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) 
Tokyo  -0.171*** -0.175*** -0.160*** -0.165*** -0.173*** -0.158*** -0.175*** -0.147*** 
Round 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
R-squared (within) 0.4201 0.4222 0.4397 0.4346 0.4442 0.4555 0.4072 0.4272 
Adj R-squared 0.3476 0.3500 0.3696 0.3640 0.3747 0.3874 0.3331 0.3556 
F-statistic 66.5202 66.1847 63.0391 63.9200 73.8117 80.3277 64.8373 74.6318 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Tokyo Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1979). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across 
countries, and the sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Regressions are based on data for the country whose 
most influential characteristic, lies at the relevant percentile. 
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Table 11: Testing Voting Rules—Decisive Country from Most Influential Characteristic, 
Weighted Specification 
 Unanimity 
1 
Median Logrolling 
1 
QMV Logrolling 
2 
Unanimity 
2 
Sum Mean 
Employment  -0.0002 -0.030* -0.013 -0.016 -0.011 0.011 0.061 -0.061 
Share 
 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.040) (0.043) 
# Firms 0.024*** 0.050*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.072*** 0.062*** -0.054*** 0.081*** 
 
 
(0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.016) 
Wage 0.018 -0.001 -0.014 0.026 0.035* 0.064*** -0.051 0.040 
 
 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.024) (0.034) (0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.033) 
Labor Cost  0.033 0.039 0.040 0.077 0.071*** -0.021 0.029 0.201*** 
Share 
 
(0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.048) (0.024) (0.028) (0.073) (0.068) 
Intra-industry 0.003 -0.022 -0.033*** -0.024** -0.015 -0.017* -0.026 -0.053* 
Ratio 
 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019) (0.029) 
Import  0.004 -0.014 0.011 0.0002 0.013 0.014 -0.014 -0.015 
Penetration 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
∆ Import  0.0004** 0.002** 0.001* 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002** 0.002*** 
Penetration 
 
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.001) 
Export Share -0.047*** -0.024 -0.034*** -0.004 -0.028*** -0.017* -0.054*** -0.026 
 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.018) 
Tokyo  -0.171*** -0.169*** -0.168*** -0.166*** -0.153*** -0.158*** -0.174*** -0.147*** 
Round 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Obs 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 810 
R-squared (within) 0.4201 0.4126 0.4240 0.4183 0.4442 0.4555 0.4160 0.4258 
Adj R-squared 0.3476 0.3392 0.3520 0.3456 0.3748 0.3874 0.3430 0.3540 
F-statistic 66.5202 64.5207 62.9585 61.7178 65.9399 80.3277 66.8389 73.7175 
Note: Panel regressions were run for 81 industries over 10 years (every other year from 1969-1987). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Estimates marked *** are 
significant at the 1-percent level; those marked ** are significant at the 5-percent level; and those marked * are 
significant at the 10-percent level. All variables are in logs, except for the change in import penetration and the 
Tokyo Round dummy (equal to 1 starting in 1979). The estimated equations also include a full set of industry 
dummies, which are not included in the calculation of the R-squared and the F-statistic, as well as a constant. Each 
column consists of one regression, with the headings indicating the voting model. Unanimity 1 refers to the model 
testing unanimity (in which the decisive national government is the one preferring the lowest tariff) under the 
assumption that the status quo is lower than proposals; median tests the median-voter model; QMV tests the 
qualified-majority voting requirement (equivalent to the 71st percentile); and logrolling 1 and logrolling 2 test 
possible logrolling outcomes (60th and 86th percentile, respectively). Unanimity 2 tests whether the pivotal country is 
the one preferring the highest tariff. The mean regression, in which industry characteristics are averaged across 
countries, and the sum regression, in which industry characteristics are summed across country, are included as 
alternatives to the decisive national government framework. Regressions are based on data for the country whose 
most influential characteristic, lies at the relevant percentile. All regressions are weighted by the number of votes 
each country has in the Council of Ministers. 
 
 
 
 38 
 Table 12. Decisive National government under Unanimity, NACE 43 (Textile Industry) 
 1st Enlargement (1973) 2nd Enlargement (1981) 3rd Enlargement (1986) 
 1971 1973 1979 1981 1985 1987 
High Tariff Italy Italy France Greece Greece Portugal 
 France France UK France France Spain 
 Germany Germany Italy Italy Italy Greece 
 Belgium UK Germany UK UK France 
 Netherlands Ireland Ireland Germany Germany Italy 
  Belgium Denmark Denmark Denmark UK 
  Denmark Belgium Ireland Belgium Denmark 
  Netherlands Netherlands Belgium Ireland Germany 
    Netherlands Netherlands Belgium 
      Ireland 
Low Tariff      Netherlands 
Note: The first enlargement consisted of Ireland, the UK, and Denmark; the second enlargement brought in Greece; 
and the third enlargement consisted of Spain and Portugal. Countries in italics are the new members. The decisive 
national government is the one whose predicted preferred tariff lies at the highest percentile.  
 
 
